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1292Heretek of Silent Signal
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cynicalsecurity 
cynicalsecurity@bsd.network
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After my recent experience with a new laptop, imposed upon me by a client, I feel the need to describe what I’d want from computing, both as a “practitioner” (“shaman”? “fool”?) and as a user.
First and foremost I like to know where my data is, both physically and logically.
I would, therefore, appreciate having some form of storage server which does everything from storing files to my calendar and email. It would be redundant, etc. (i.e. a NAS of some form).
Secondly, we’d have IPv6 so that I could reach said server from everywhere without NAT, CGNAT, transparent carrier-to-carrier NAT (you don’t want to know), etc.
Then, for those who have computing needs, we would have a co-system we would connect next to the NAS, automatically speaking some form of NFS (no, not SMB, not over my dead body) and which would be used automatically by the NAS when a request needed oomph (e.g. video editing on a stored video).
All of this would be topped with a beautiful “portable viewer” which would have a laptop size / format and would do nothing other than connect over the network to your server and allow you to “do things.”
A mobile phone would, similarly, tap into your server to do what it needs to do.
There would be minimal storage on these edge devices.
Wait, you say, this is “The Cloud”.
No, it is absolutely not because I want the data to be mine and nothing to be on the edge devices.
Wait, you say again, this is “Plan 9 meets VNC (in its original Olivetti Research Labs incarnation)”.
Yes, it is.
I still believe that one of the worst ever decisions to be taken was the PC back in 1981 followed by the obtusity of many in thinking that somehow PC “democratised” computing or could replace mainframes, minis and servers with its architecture.
Quoting “The 6M Dollar Man”: We can rebuild him; we have the technology.
We don’t need to continue using the crap they peddle us, we need to sit down and say “OK, now let’s be grown ups and build what we need, not what others want to us to build.” (note: 0xide is a step in that direction)
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Foone🏳️⚧️
foone@digipres.clubI love programs with anti-debuger checks. By definition, the people you're "stopping" from debugging your program are the same ones who have the tools to delete your debugger check.
It's like specifically locking a door to keep lockpickers out
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buherator
buheratorMy friends at Ravenfortech wrote an introductory #malwareanalysis post on the INC #Ransomware:
https://translate.kagi.com/https://scribe.rip/@ravenfortech/inc-ransomware-elemz%C3%A9s-a909b5aed114
This gang recently pwned the Hungarian company responsible for military procurement (VBÜ) and now selling the data for $1M.
Based on the analysis the malware is very simple. INC uses 2023 CitrixBleed (2023) and spear phishing for initial access:
https://www.sentinelone.com/anthology/inc-ransom/
This doesn’t paint a picture of mature security at VBÜ to say the least…
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bert hubert 🇺🇦🇪🇺
bert_hubert@fosstodon.orgI've started a page listing for many fields (physics, computing, biology, history..) the most Totemic Books. The ones that are central to the field, the books you wished you had learned about earlier. The work no one in a field can do without. Please send me your suggestions so we can share the love more broadly! https://berthub.eu/articles/posts/totemic-books-for-many-fields/
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buherator
buheratorhttps://jericho.blog/2024/11/28/dont-be-a-cve-dummy/
"So please, if you are writing documentation and need to use dummy CVE identifiers, please use one of the ones MITRE designated a decade ago"
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Andrew Kelley
andrewrk@mastodon.socialIf you are planning to learn Zig via Advent of Code this year, I highly recommend the tips from @kristoff 's blog post:
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stacksmashing
stacksmashing@infosec.exchangeCan someone send me the (untruncated) output of ioreg on an M4 MacBook/Mac Mini?
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buherator
buheratorIt is just natural that in #Ghidra #Sleigh “The [operand] identifier must appear in the [bit pattern section] as if it were a term in a sequence of constraints but without the operator and right-hand side of the constraint.”, see section 7.4.3:
https://scrapco.de/ghidra_docs/GhidraDocs/languages/html/sleigh_constructors.html
But it seems, you can’t use the identifier in the display of the instruction if it’s part of a constraint.
Error: “wrong type (should be family) in pattern equation”
Why is that?!
(Workaround: define an alias token for the same bits and use that in display)
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Giorgio Maone 🚫✊🧅
ma1@todon.euI've just subscribed to MDN Plus, perhaps the most valuable resource for #WebDev, browser extensions & #developers in general, which I've used for free so many years. Stepped up to paid subscription as a small thanks to @mozilla , and also to unlock the offline premium feature 
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/
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Hexacorn 
hexacorn@infosec.exchange
1 little known secret of ShellExec_RunDLL
https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2024/11/30/1-little-known-secret-of-shellexec_rundll/
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buherator
buheratorhttps://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20241129-00/?p=110588
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Street Art Utopia
streetartutopia@mastodon.onlineLuke and Leia take center stage in this vibrant panel of Budapest’s Star Wars mural by Rawman, CSM, Little Mejo, and Time.
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This is the largest breakthrough in Windows / Office piracy ever.
This solution will be available in the coming months—stay tuned for updates!
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Hector Martin
marcan@social.treehouse.systemsSooo Ars, after correcting the original deeply flawed, pure clickbait article, has now doubled down with new info about how "Bootkitty" is actually used.
TL;DR: I was right about Bootkitty only being useful at all for UEFI Secure Boot systems. Turns out there's a separate component that exploits LogoFAIL, a year-old UEFI vulnerability discovered by researchers, to enroll Bootkitty's key into UEFI Secure Boot, which then bypasses the need for user consent for the new bootloader.
So, to recap:
- There is no new vulnerability here. This is not a zero-day.
- Everything in this proof-of-concept attack is just putting things we already knew were possible together.
- Bootkitty is still just PoC level and useless on real production systems, since it still works only on a single Ubuntu kernel.
- Bootkitty is still not a real bootkit, just a component that's part of enabling the Secure Boot bypass, and trivial to remove and detect.
- This whole thing is still not persistent in any way in firmware, and trivial to remove. The LogoFAIL exploit is also stored on disk, not anywhere in firmware.
- This is not a remote exploit, or a local user exploit. You need root to install it, there is no extra OS-level exploit chain anywhere to be seen.
The only news here is that someone decided to use LogoFAIL, which again was discovered a year ago, to create the capability of installing a traditional, old school kernel rootkit on UEFI Secure Boot systems without user consent on reboot. Which, again, is obviously possible when you have something like LogoFAIL. And you still need root access to install any of this.
To reiterate, this only matters if your threat model is an attacker might get root on my system, but they won't be able to install a kernel-level rootkit because I use Secure Boot, oh and also I didn't bother to patch LogoFAIL. Note that under this model an attacker can still install user-level rootkits anyway, so it's... certainly an interesting model. Also note that under this model an attacker can also just install any old known-vulnerable-to-something distro kernel (there is no revocation for those) and then exploit it to add the rootkit on every boot, achieving the same result of a module rootkit on a Secure Boot system without any of the LogoFAIL or Bootkitty nonsense. You could even just kexec into a backdoored newer kernel that way.
So, cute and interesting, yes. Still a PoC and a nothingburger for the security world. If you rely on UEFI Secure Boot's guarantees and you haven't patched LogoFAIL one year later, that's on you.
And if you take the Secure Boot stuff seriously you should probably get an Apple Silicon Mac anyway, because UEFI Secure Boot is Swiss cheese with a massive attack surface and stuff like LogoFAIL is bound to keep happening.
Edit: Aaaand it indeed was a student project.
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