Critical vulnerabilities in Ivanti Sentry (CERT-EU Security Advisory 2026-008)

On 9 June 2026, Ivanti released a security advisory addressing two critical vulnerabilities in their Sentry products[1]. An attacker could exploit those flaws to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution on the vulnerable device.

https://www.cert.europa.eu/publications/security-advisories/2026-008/

Holy collisions batman:

@harrysintonen
> any competing AI assistant would have to be granted the same deep system reach as Siri AI, including the ability to read and send messages, make purchases and act across apps.

wouldn't it be great to have that kind of API accessible from a scripting language, or from some GUI "connect the blocks" automation engine?

Typed `id` on a stock Ubuntu Server. Default user already in the `lxd` group, which is root-equivalent.

Host root on every LTS from 20.04 to 26.04, sudo never entered. Bonus: a free AppArmor hardening downgrade for the whole box.

Vendor: won't-fix.

https://starlabs.sg/blog/2026/06-old-wine-in-a-new-bottle-a-decade-old-lxd-group-root-re-armed/

Our intern Tevel Sho and his mentor @cursered spent some time poking at Cisco ISE. 40+ bugs reported. 4 dupes. This dupe is RCE as root:
https://starlabs.sg/advisories/26/26-20147/

I employ a two-pronged defence against phishing:

First, I am so behind on reading my email that, by the time a phishing message actually gets read, the original scammers have probably had their site taken down, or maybe died of old age.

Second, I don’t know any of my passwords and, if your domain doesn’t match, my password manager won’t fill them, and I’m much too lazy to fill them manually, so will probably just close the window. If it looks important, I’ll flag the email and come back to it eventually. Maybe.

I'm really curious what the CVE graphs will look like once companies have to start paying to secure their own software. I find it hard to believe that companies with 10-20 people looking for 0day will spend $1M+/mo on Claude once they stop getting low hanging fruit?

Like I kinda thought Mythos was gonna include a suite of tools to help find security bugs, and the model would be to sell that tooling + mythos to companies? But instead it's just another chat bot lmao. People are going to get wildly different results based on their tooling

So here's the other thing that bothers me about all this. Regardless of the eventual results, this thing they're doing is *incredibly* resource intensive. They routinely spend billions of dollars on training these models, and billions more on operating them. It's not simple to parse out what fraction of that is directly attributable to the massive scale vuln finder/fabricator. But for the sake of argument lets just pick a plausible number, and call it 50-100 million dollars.

What could we have gotten for 50-100 million dollars of sponsorship for security audits? Prior to this, the largest single investment into FOSS security I'm aware of was the 2015 audit of openssl, after the heartbleed incident. It's hard to find precise costs for that, but I found a few sources estimating 1.2 million dollars, and that is arguably the most security critical piece of software in the world.

But suddenly there's 100x more resources available to do this work, now that producing the artifact can be done with stolen labor? Now that they can externalize the cost of false positives onto the already mostly unpaid maintainers of these projects? Even if their claims are true, which we have no reason to believe and very good reason not to, it's still a travesty

German ruling declares Google liable for false answers in AI Overviews

"AI" news are rarely good news, this one is. I hope this becomes an EU-wide thing eventually.

World-wide would be nicer, but I have no hope for the current US admin.

#algernonReviewsHackerNews

Nightmare Eclipse has released a new exploit: RoguePlanet

It's reportedly not 100% reliable, but it worked on the first attempt for me.

https://starlabs.sg/blog/2026/06-old-wine-in-a-new-bottle-a-decade-old-lxd-group-root-re-armed/ reminds me of the time I pointed out that /usr/local/* was writable by the staff group on Debian. Privesc by design.