@da_667 Now you nerdsniped me to do this with tshark (well, maybe tomorrow), I'd be utterly disappointed if this couldn't be done with a pcap output format:

https://tshark.dev/export/export_tls/

@da_667 umm, wireshark?

A sign of the times.

There is at least one Adobe Reader 0day being exploited in the wild:
https://justhaifei1.blogspot.com/2026/04/expmon-detected-sophisticated-zero-day-adobe-reader.html

TL;DR: One 0day is being used to simply communicate details to a C2 server to get further commands. Specifically, there is a vulnerability that allows reading arbitrary local files using Reader JavaScript. In this case, ntdll.dll and friends, so that the C2 knows specifically what version of Windows the victim is running.

Nobody knows what secondary payload the C2 is delivering to selected targets. But it's a direct pipeline to allow the C2 to run arbitrary JavaScript on the victim system.

So I'll bet dollars to donuts that there is a second more powerful vulnerability that the attackers have up their sleeves. Or at the very least, the same vulnerability that allows the privileged file read might be able to be leveraged to do something nasty. And the whole AES-encrypted C2 stuff is merely to not put the payload statically in the exploit PDF, allowing a dynamic payload for any given target.

Artemis II mission planning:

"We strap you on a rocket, launch around the Moon based on some absurdly complicated mathematical formulas, then guide you back down the atmosphere at insane speeds, trying hard not to burn you alive.

Finally, we have to make sure you don't splash down at these particular areas of our planet, or some angry Earthlican may just shoot you."

Humanity is weird.

@kaoudis Wow, beautiful! After filtered Anthropic-related results from my search I still thought the images were LLM generated...

cpuid has been compromised, most downloads are serving a rat+infostealer as we speak, make sure you didn't get hit

We publish a major Citizen Lab report on Webloc, an ad-based mass surveillance system that monitors the movements and personal characteristics of hundreds of millions people globally based on data obtained from mobile apps and digital advertising.

Customers include ICE, El Salvador and Hungary.

Our research shows that ad-based surveillance is now used by military, intelligence and law enforcement agencies down to local police in several countries.

Full report here:
https://citizenlab.ca/research/analysis-of-penlinks-ad-based-geolocation-surveillance-tech/

This comic needed an update

@timb_machine What kind of information do you hope to extract from this? KEV data is incomplete, CVE data is extremely noisy and incomplete.

@ilmari quite notably different!

Very slightly work adjacent: a "we've updated our privacy policy" email in my inbox reminded me of a thing that $work did, and that I wish every company did: we checked all our ToS and similar documents into a git repo and published it, so that when they change you can just go look at the damn diff and see what changed (https://github.com/tailscale/terms-and-conditions).

If you work someplace and have the authority to do this, I wish this was normalized and expected of corporations that expect us to ingest a short story worth of legalese and keep up with the changes over time.

Thanks to
@jasminecarter.bsky.social
my cumulative complexity calculator for #Ghidra now has a cute logo:

https://github.com/v-p-b/rabbithole

@obivan There is a lot of nuance to consider with these results, incl. feasibility with other models (I'm willing to believe it's doable). But e.g. the FP problem doesn't seem at all that limiting as some suggest and some of the results (with Mythos&others) are very hard to ignore as a vulnerability researcher.

Fair criticism of the latest @Bellingcat piece about leaked .gov.hu credentials (HU, use your favorite translator):

https://kiber.blog.hu/2026/04/09/tobb_szaz_magyar_kormanyzati_jelszo_kerult_ki_az_internetre_ja_de_mikor

There is *a lot* to report about in Hungarian politics/natsec, but digging up old credential dumps just misdirects attention and discredits relevant investigative work.

Unfortunately many skeptical takes on #Mythos / #Glasswing remind me of Gell-Mann amnesia:

https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Gell-Mann_Amnesia_effect

Every #LLM company and claim deserves ruthless skepticism, but arguments based on falsehoods and misunderstandings don't lead us forward.

Watching this talk is recommended:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1sd26pWhfmg

Near as I can tell, this is all very good news. More things should take advantage of secure enclaves, and this open standard protects against one of the hardest current defense surfaces.

https://security.googleblog.com/2026/04/protecting-cookies-with-device-bound.html

Former Trenchant exec who stole exploits from his employer and sold them to a Russian broker says he was suffering depression & money troubles when he decided to sell the exploits. Also, new info reveals the nature of the work he did for an Australian intel agency before joining Trenchant. My story is linked below. Please consider becoming a paid subscriber if you like my work on this piece. It's 4,000 words and I'm making it available for free to everyone. But I can only do that because some subscribers have generously become paid subscribers.

https://www.zetter-zeroday.com/trenchant-exec-says-he-had-depression-money-troubles-when-he-decided-to-sell-zero-days-to-russian-buyer-also-new-info-reveals-nature-of-his-work-for-australian-intelligence-agency/?ref=zero-day-newsletter

I came across a reference to #Wazuh in another thread. It looks interesting: an open-source thing that can manage a bunch of compliance requirements.

So I went looking for information about their agent's security. Things I did find:

• Installing it requires root and it appears to run as root.

Things I did not find:

• Any security audit of the agent.
• Any documentation on how they do privilege separation in the agent.
• Any design docs for the agent.
• Any threat model docs for the agent.

Are these things somewhere I missed? Anyone familiar with the project know how they avoid their network-connected-and-highly-privileged thing being an attack vector for client devices? Is it possible to run it sandboxed with read-only access to the system (for reporting violations but not automatically trying to fix them)?