@mumblegrepper Just to be clear by "feedback" I meant "coverage feedback", reflecting on your post. You'll definitely need something to catch unexpected behavior and correlate it with your inputs but that's true for simple enumeration too.

100% agree on fuzzy definitions :)

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@mumblegrepper *tucks sleeve* fine, let's do some taxonomy!

I don't think feedback is relevant, the first fuzzers didn't use that.

I see two techniques often mixed up with "classical" fuzzing:

1) Trying identifiers, e.g. IDOR, URL paths, subdomains, etc. My argument here is since our inputs never trigger "new control-flows" this is not fuzzing. (It's tricky how we define control-flow in this case, but I think you get the point).

2) Vuln scanning with magic strings. Now you are right to point out that magic strings are definitely part of fuzzing (e.g. 0, -1, INT_MAX), and this is where the lines get blurry. My current working definition here is that fuzzing starts somewhere when you are physically limited in trying all reasonable inputs (note that no real filesystem will require a trillion ../'s to detect a path traversal) and systematic algorithms (e.g. adding one more backslash) aren't effective, so you might as well start gambling.

WDYT?

@mumblegrepper Is it though? I remember that "pipe /dev/random to unix tools" paper as the original sin (which is random + open ended)?

Worst part is they may be technically right

[RSS] It rather involved being on the other side of the airtight hatchway: Tricking(?) a program into reading files

https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20260216-00/?p=112065

Men's shirts: buttons on the right
Men's pants: buttons on the right
Women's pants: buttons on the right

Women's shirts: buttons on the left

buttons-on-the-left is the big endian of clothing

Have you ever wondered what it's like when security specialists and engineers work around the clock to fix a critical security bug in less than two days?

Watch LiveOverflow's documentary on pwn2own and how we fixed not only one but TWO security bugs.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQEq5s4SRxY

RE: https://social.coop/@cwebber/116110194513314869

as an information security professional,

This idea not only will not work logistically,

but attempts to implement it will significantly increase the number of vulnerability surfaces for any OS that supports it, leading to a significantly less safe computing experience for everyone.

And this is before we even begin to talk about the fascist invasion of the state into personal property.

Every single legislator involved in this farce ought to be removed from office, as they are clearly incapable of addressing the real concerns of the populace and are putting burdens on industry and on consumers that are wildly out of proportion with any conceivable benefit that might arise even in theory.

In the recently released badkeys v0.0.17, a new check for an RSA vulnerability has been added: RSA keys with small private d values, also known as Wiener's attack: https://badkeys.info/docs/smalld.html

RSA keys have a public exponent e and a private exponent d. Usually, we set the public exponent to a small value (these days, largely standardized to e=65537), which automatically means the private value d is about as large as the public modulus. d/e are interexchangable, and it's possible to create insecure keys with small d and large e value. Wiener's attack (first published 1989) allows breaking such keys.

This weakness can be entirely prevented if one simply does not support keys with large public e values. This is, e.g., the case in the go crypto library, see, e.g., this old (2012) blogpost by @agl https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/03/16/rsae.html

Even more secure is to fix the e value to its common default (e=65537). This is small enough to be still fast, and it avoids both attacks relying on large e (Wiener's attack) and very small e values like 3 (Bleichenbacher's Signature Forgery/BERserk, Coppersmith/Håstad attack).

Do I know anyone who has access to this PDF?
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-81375-7_19

edit: I do.

30 years ago, Bob Morris, then a senior scientist at NSA, gave a keynote talk at the CRYPTO conference (the leading conference for academic cryptographers).

He opened by telling us he would reveal the NSA's first rule for cryptanalysis (which certainly got our attention). "First", he said, "look for cleartext. You'll usually find it."

True words, and enduring, too.

@mattblaze

there's this line from Adventure Time that I'm obsessed with...

"I learned to read braille from my ex."

"Your ex was blind?"

"No, just cool."

absolutely sums up my love for that show. just teaching excellent vibes all the way through without being preachy.

Tony Gilroy, creator of Andor, wasn’t allowed to use the word “fascism” during press junkets in 2025. Interesting interview in The Hollywood Reporter. www.hollywoodreporter.com/tv/tv-featur...

Over the past couple years, I have come to know the #dotnet platform pretty well, from a developer's and a #reversing standpoint.

I can’t always say the same the #infosec community.

Today, I decided to rant a little (or maybe a lot 🙃)

👉 https://blog.washi.dev/posts/misconceptions-about-dotnet/

Amazingly, it's weekend and I kind of miss coding Rust.

If this is not Stockholm syndrome I don't know what is.

Anyway, I promised to finish my next #REshare exporter in a week two weeks ago so let's get back to Python!

Love Complex Automata? Don’t Miss The Archer

https://hackaday.com/2026/02/21/love-complex-automata-dont-miss-the-archer/

ART/AB4.GIF

@amanda @b0rk Cross references, yes! How do I use those? Also, I just looked at `man man` and noticed that there is no ToC ("Is there even something about hotkeys in this thing?").